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ABSTRACT 
 
Following a CEO turnover, a company may select an internal or external successor. The 
objective of this study is to determine if firm performance, board attributes, ownership 
structure and incumbent power influence the decision of whether to elect an internal or 
external candidate. Results from logistic regression analysis on 145 succession events 
over a four-year period (2002 to 2005) indicate that firms which are controlled by 
blockholders tend to select an outsider as the successor. Further, firms that are 
controlled by family members and position their former CEOs within the firms are more 
likely to select insiders as successors. However, firm performance, board composition, 
CEO duality and turnover type do not affect the selection choice. This study implies that 
poor firm performance does not necessarily lead to outside CEO selection choice. 
Further, boards of Malaysian PLCs are not effective in choosing outsiders as successors 
as both board composition and CEO duality do not necessarily select outsiders to become 
new CEOs. Another implication of this study is that former CEOs who continue their 
directorship in the same companies do have some power in naming new CEOs as the 
former tend to select insiders as successors.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
The issue of who the successor will be in a Chief Executive Officer (CEO) 
turnover is always an important concern in organisational theory. This is because 
the choice of successor origin need to be carefully determined by the company as 
the impact of this selection will significantly influence firms' future strategies, 
policies and performance (Khurana, 1998). He adds that the decision to fire 
poorly performing CEO does not benefit the firms or shareholders unless the 
board of directors appoints a more capable successor.  
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The selection of the successor, either from inside or outside the company will be 
determined by the board of directors. The board may decide to limit its search to 
inside candidates or it may decide to broaden its search by considering outside 
candidates. The choice of a successor becomes a debate because the internal or 
external successor has his or her own strength. The proponents of insider 
succession highlight the importance of continuity and loyalty (Kotter, 1982; 
Lauterbach, Vu, & Weisberg, 1999). In contrast, an outsider succession may 
occur when there is organizational stress, such as poor performance, as outsider 
successions are generally prescribed as a remedy for firm difficulties (Parrino, 
1997; Cannella & Lubatkin, 1993). 
 
Despite the drop in the number of CEO succession events worldwide since 2003 
until 2010 (Favaro, Karlsson, & Neilson, 2011), CEO succession is an important 
concern not only in developed countries, but also in Malaysia. However, little is 
known as to factors that lead to the decision of whether an insider or an outsider 
should become a successor. To the best of our knowledge, no studies have been 
conducted thus far in Malaysia to investigate the issue. Thus, the main objective 
of this study is to examine the selection choice of CEO successors, that is, either 
from an inside or outside source. In addition, this study investigates whether 
company performance, board attributes, ownership structure and incumbent 
CEO's power influence CEO selection choice in Malaysian public listed 
companies (PLCs). Malaysia is of interest not only because it is a developing 
country with an emerging capital market but also because of its unique corporate 
governance structure. While corporate governance, particularly the board 
structure, follows the Anglo-American model, the ownership structure is more 
towards the Franco-Germany model, whereby family ownership and state (or 
government) ownership is prevalent (Thillainathan, 1999). Similarly, Gibson 
(2003) argues that Malaysian companies are more often held by founding 
families and operate in an environment of relatively poor enforcement of 
shareholder's legal rights. 
 
Results from the logistic regression analysis for the period of 2002–2005 reveal 
that firms that are controlled by block holders tend to select outsiders as 
successors. In contrast, firms that are governed by families and retain their former 
CEOs with other directorship post are more likely to name insiders as successors. 
Based on our results, it is hoped that this study will provide guidance to 
companies in their decisions that is whether to select inside or outside candidates 
as successors. Besides ownership structure, the power of CEO is amongst the 
factors that need to be considered by firms before they select their CEOs.  
 
The rest of this paper is organised as follows. First, we discuss the literature 
review and theoretical development. Next, the methods employed are presented. 
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This is followed by a discussion of results. We end the paper with a conclusion 
section. 
 
 
LITERATURE REVIEW AND THEORETICAL DEVELOPMENT 
 
The literature on CEO succession suggests several viewpoints related to the 
selection decision, i.e. the adaptive view, inertial view, scapegoating view and 
contingency view (Cannella & Lubatkin, 1993). Proponents of the adaptive view 
argue that organisations change or adapt in response to the environmental 
challenges and that CEO selection decisions represent an important adaptation 
mechanism. Accordingly, poor performance increases the likelihood of CEO 
turnover and when performance is poor, the board of directors will favour outside 
candidates as they believe outsiders are more capable of changing the mission, 
objectives and strategies of the firm than the insiders.  
 
The second view of succession is the inertial view and proponents of this view 
argue that the selection process is relatively unadaptive because many people 
with vested interests are involved (Shen & Cannella, 2002). Proponents are of the 
view that environment continues to change but companies, particularly the large 
ones, often resist to change, even when faced with poor performance. These 
companies tend to select internal candidates if they decide to change the CEO. 
 
The third view of succession is the scapegoating view. Boeker (1992) provides 
evidence that powerful CEOs of poorly performing firms will deflect the blame 
onto weaker subordinates. These weaker subordinates are subsequently dismissed 
while the CEO remains. The final view of succession is contingency view which 
is based on the sociopolitical approach to CEO succession. Advocates of this 
view suggest that several sociopolitical factors moderate the relationship between 
performance and the board of directors' decision making, causing the board of 
directors to react differently to a similar performance information (Cannella & 
Lubatkin, 1993). 
 
Inside and Outside Succession 
 
The major concern of this study is the selection of new CEOs whether from 
internal or external sources. Pfeffer (1981) claims that a new CEO, whether an 
insider or an outsider, can either enhance or diminish the power of the 
organisation's board members. In addition, the choice of a successor has 
important consequences on the firm's future strategies and structure.  
 
There are many arguments related to the issue of who the suitable candidates 
would be. For example, Kotter (1982) argue that, insiders are more 
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knowledgeable than outsiders about firms' specific products, competitors, 
markets, customers and employees. This knowledge will help managers 
understand a large, complex, and diverse set of activities and lead them to make 
appropriate decisions. Furthermore, internal successions also promote loyalty and 
establish social networks including superiors, subordinates, peers and others 
through which they gain information and support needed to perform their job 
(Lauterbach, Vu, & Weisberg, 1999). In other words, insiders provide smooth 
transition and stability since they are well acquainted and have participated in 
developing the existing corporate strategy.  
 
In contrast, Zinkin (2010) comments that bringing in an outside successor is 
essential when drastic changes are required. The outside candidates are more 
promising as they are not bonded by the existing policies. In addition, they do not 
have vested interest in the past and no previous decisions of their own to defend 
or to undo. Besides that, outside succession can enrich the company with new 
perspectives, fresh ideas and decisive actions (Furtado & Karan, 1990; Zinkin, 
2010). 
 
Our definition of an insider (internal successor) and an outsider (external 
successor) follows the definition proposed by Dalton and Kesner (1985), who 
define an inside successor as a manager or employee promoted from within a 
firm and an outside successor as a newly appointed top management from outside 
a firm. 
 
Corporate Performance and CEO Succession 
 
Boeker and Goodstein (1993) and Lauterbach et al. (1999) argue that poor past 
performance affects the origin of the new successor and their studies found that 
poor past performance leads to external selection choice. Alternatively, firms 
with good past performance tend to appoint an internal successor. External 
candidates who often have broader exposure and experience gained through their 
employment at other firms will introduce alternative ways to lead a poorly 
performing firm. In their study, Lauterbach et al. (1999) show that 60% of poor 
performers appoint outsiders as successors while 82% of top performers appoint 
insiders as successors. Their findings support the argument that firms with poor 
performance need to make some changes and external succession becomes more 
likely because an external successor is believed to conceive and implement fresh 
initiatives (Cannella & Lubatkin, 1993). Denis and Denis (1995) find that the 
ratio of operational income to total assets increases following the outside 
successor selection.  
 
The above results support the adaptive view of succession that appointing new 
external CEOs by poorly performing firms may give good impression about the 
 82
Determinants of CEO Successions in Malaysia 
companies. The shareholders may view the new outsider CEO more superior than 
the former CEO as the external successor might add value to the company. 
Therefore, it is reasonable to believe that the owner of poor performing firms will 
prefer an outsider as they perceive an outsider will bring some changes to their 
companies, including the improvement of their companies' performance 
(Cannella & Lubatkin, 1993; Boeker & Goodstein, 1993). Thus, based on the 
above arguments, we hypothesize that: 
 
H1:  Poorly performing firms are more likely to appoint outsiders as 
CEO successors.  
 
Board of Directors' Attributes and CEO Succession 
 
Boeker and Goodstein (1993) and Cannella and Lubatkin (1993) suggest that 
besides prior performance, other factors such as board attributes and ownership 
concentration do influence the choice of successors. The main function of a board 
is to act as the representative of the shareholders and as the central body for 
decision making in a company. In order to become an effective board, Malaysian 
Code of Corporate Governance (MCCG) suggests that one third of the board 
should consist of outside members and different individuals should hold the post 
of a CEO and a chairman.  
 
Board composition  
 
The composition of the board has an impact on the internal control system of a 
firm and it has been shown that a balanced board, including both inside and 
outside executives, will enhance the board's role as an internal control mechanism 
(Khurana, 1998). With respect to CEO succession decisions, agency theory 
predicts that inside directors tend to support insiders and oppose outside 
candidates. The rationale is that an internal candidate may add value to the firm 
since he or she is already involved in developing and implementing the firm's 
current policies (Khurana, 1998). Due to their knowledge and involvement, 
inside candidates are thus seen as the best candidates for CEOs.  
 
Mizruichi (1983) argues that if a board is dominated by insiders, it will likely 
choose a CEO who poses a minimal threat of disruption and the most suitable 
person is typically someone from within the firm whom they already know. 
Hence, firms with insider-controlled boards tend to select insiders for their job 
and interest security as opposed to outsider-dominated boards. Likewise, agency 
theory also states that a board can potentially exercise control over managers and 
suggests that outsider-dominated boards act more independently in making CEO 
selection decisions. Therefore, we propose the following hypothesis.  
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H2:  Firms that have a high proportion of inside board members are 
less likely to appoint outsiders as CEOs. 
 
CEO duality 
  
Advocates of stewardship theory suggest that the combined functions of a CEO 
and a chairman (unitary leadership structure) provides unified firm leadership, 
and removes any internal or external ambiguity regarding who is responsible for 
firms, processes and outcomes. Haniffa and Cooke (2002) argue that efficiency in 
monitoring management can be enhanced through Chairman-CEO duality as less 
contracting is needed and information asymmetries is reduced. However, Pi and 
Timme (1993) claim that cost-efficiency and return on assets are lower when a 
CEO is also a Chairman. The argument is that the CEO-cum-Chairman will have 
concentrated power base which will allow the CEO to make decisions for his/her 
own-self interest at the expense of shareholders. Morck, Shleifer and Vishney 
(1988) suggest that the number of titles held by a single individual may indicate a 
power vested by that individual. Regarding the selection of the successor, 
Cannella and Lubatkin (1993) claim that a CEO who also holds the board's 
chairmanship will increase the power of the incumbent CEO. Due to the power 
that they have, they will intervene during the selection of a new successor. They 
tend to nominate a potential candidate who will maintain their status quo; they 
will choose an insider as the successor. Based on the above argument, we 
hypothesize the following: 
 
H3:  Firms that exercise CEO/chairman duality are less likely to 
appoint outsiders as CEOs. 
 
Ownership Structure and CEO Succession 
 
Family ownership 
 
Family-controlled firms normally plan the succession of their CEOs by electing 
the heir apparent to be groomed up (Tsai, Hung, Kuo, & Kuo, 2006). This action 
is taken in order to ensure that their business empire will continue under the same 
family management. In the case of family controlled firms, profitability is not the 
only goal. According to Allen and Panian (1982), direct control by a family 
member, with all the power and privileges that this control confers on the other 
members of the family, may became a goal in itself. Indeed, controlling families 
may be willing to sacrifice some degree of corporate profitability in order to 
retain some degree of direct family control over the corporation. Family values 
like trust, altruism and paternalism can create an atmosphere of love for a 
business, and a sense of commitment is very important for family-owned 
companies (Chami, 1997). Therefore, due to their commitment and loyalty, even 
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in the case of poor performance, family-controlled firms will select one of their 
family members as the successor. Thus, the following hypothesis is proposed.  
 
H4:  Firms that are controlled by families are less likely to appoint 
outside successors as CEOs. 
 
Blockholding 
  
Sufficiently large ownership by blockholders can support more active boards and 
reduce agency problems by reducing management entrenchment (Aggarwal, Erel, 
Ferreira, & Matos, 2009). Davidson III, Nemec, Worrell and Lin (2002) claim 
that a successor in a blockholder-controlled organisation is expected to be an 
outsider as the board is not influenced by any controlling shareholders in making 
its decision. In the case of poor performing firms, an outside candidate is 
preferable as he or she is not responsible with the firm's ongoing strategy and 
policy. Thus, new changes and fresh ideas will be introduced by the outside 
successor in order to improve firm performance. Hence, we propose that: 
 
H5:  Firms that are controlled by blockholders are more likely to 
appoint outside successors as CEOs. 
 
 
Turnover Type and CEO Succession 
 
A CEO turnover can be classified either as a forced or voluntary turnover. 
Turnovers due to relay succession, normal retirement, early retirement and death 
or poor health condition are classified as voluntary turnovers (Friedman & Singh, 
1989; Cannella & Lubatkin, 1993). On the other hand, a turnover event is 
categorised as forced if all officerships and directorships associated with the 
outgoing CEO were severed at the time of succession (Denis & Denis, 1995). 
 
In a succession process, the type of turnover (forced or voluntary) may also 
influence the type of the successor (insider or outsider). Empirical evidence is not 
supportive of the adaptive view of succession which predicts that a forced 
turnover will lead to an outside succession. For example, Parrino (1997) 
documents that forced turnovers arising from poor performance are more likely to 
result in inside rather than outside successions. Similarly, Shen and Cannella 
(2002) find that 38 out of 65 dismissed CEOs (i.e. 58%) are succeeded by 
insiders. They claim that their result is not in line with the adaptive theory due to 
power dynamics within CEOs themselves. The power dynamics influence the 
selection process of the successor which, in turn, leads to an internal succession 
rather than an external succession. We thus test the following hypothesis: 
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H6:  Firms that experience forced turnover are less likely to appoint 
outsiders as CEO successors. 
 
Predecessor Disposition and CEO Selection 
 
Cannella and Lubatkin (1993) claim that CEO disposition (the change from one 
position to another within a firm) signals that the incumbent knowledge and 
expertise are still needed by a firm. Friedman and Singh (1989) state that firms 
with a healthy financial performance tend to retain their incumbent top 
management, whereas poorly performing firms tend to dismiss their top 
management. This statement is supported by Lauterbach et al. (1999) as they 
claim that former CEOs are often retained on the board as the chairman of the 
executive committee to utilise the CEO's valuable knowledge on the company 
and business. The retention of former CEOs may also reflect significant 
shareholdings by the CEO and his family. 
 
The existence of a predecessor on the board may also influence the selection of 
the successor, and it is reasonable to assume that firms that retain their former 
CEOs signal their preferences for some continuity (Lauterbach et al. 1999). Thus, 
an inside successor is preferable to an outside successor when the predecessor 
CEO is still holding an official position in the company.The reason is that an 
insider will continue with the existing policies and strategies established by the 
firm. In other words, the selection of an inside successor will secure both 
predecessor CEO job and other board members' directorships (Boeker, 1992). 
Hence, we state the hypothesis as follows: 
 
H7:  Firms that retain their predecessor CEOs are less likely to 
appoint outsiders as successors. 
 
 
METHODS 
 
Data  
 
This study focuses on CEO succession for a four-year period from 2002 to 2005 
inclusive. Year 2002 is selected as a starting year to control for the influence and 
consequences of the 1997/98 financial crisis. In addition, the MCCG was already 
in place during the period. A large number of companies suffered financial 
distress during the 1997–1998 period and were expected to reorganise their 
financial and operation policy in order to expand their businesses. The ending 
period of year 2005 is chosen due to the introduction of the new Financial 
Reporting Standards (FRS) in 2006 that replace the standards established by the 
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Malaysian Accounting Standard Board (MASB). The new standards would have 
some impacts on the calculation of the accounting ratios used in this study1.  
 
This study employs a logistic regression analysis to determine the relationship 
between performance, board composition, firm ownership, type of turnover, 
predecessor disposition and CEO selection choice2. The unit analysis of this 
study is CEO succession in Malaysian PLCs. The population comprises of 
companies that are traded and listed on Bursa Malaysia. There were 258 cases of 
CEO succession during the period 2002 to 2005. However, after omitting 
MESDAQ companies (4), delisted companies (28), financial institutions (6), 
companies with incomplete financial data (26), companies whose annual reports 
are inaccessible (12), companies whose CEO change more than once (33), 
companies with joint CEOs (2) and companies experiencing mergers and take-
overs (2), we finally have 145 succession events in our sample3. 
 
Variable Measurement  
 
CEO origin (Outsider). The dependent variable is the CEO selection choice (i.e. 
insider or outsider). Successor origin is coded as ''0'' if the successor is from 
inside the firm, and ''1'' if from outside.  
 
Average ROA (AVROA). Return on Assets (ROA) is the measure of firm 
performance. The ROA is measured as the ratio of accounting earnings before 
interest and taxes to the book value of assets. This study uses a two-year average 
performance because a firm usually does not immediately react to poor 
performance by replacing its CEO in the year the poor performance occurs 
(Boeker & Goodstein, 1993). 
 
Board composition (BCOMP). Board composition is measured as the proportion 
of non-executive directors (NEDs) to the total number of directors on the board 
of the company. This method is used, among others, by Borokhovich, Brunarski, 
Donahue and Harman (2006). 
 
CEO duality (DUALITY). The variable is coded as ''1'' if the outgoing CEO is 
also a chairman and ''0'', otherwise. This measurement is used, for example, by 
Cannella and Lubatkin (1993). 
 
Family ownership (FAMILY). Family ownership is defined as the proportion of 
ordinary shares owned by family directors group to the total shares outstanding 
(Haniffa & Cooke, 2002).  
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Blockholding (BLOCK). Blockholding is measured as a percentage of shares 
owned by individuals who hold 5% or more of the total shares outstanding (The 
Companies Act 1965, 1993, Para 69D). 
 
Turnover type (TURNTYPE). Turnover type is classified as either voluntary or 
forced turnover. Succession theory suggests that there are at least four voluntary 
scenarios, namely relay succession, normal retirement, early retirement and death 
or poor health (Friedman & Singh, 1989; Cannella & Lubatkin, 1993). With 
respect to forced turnover, Dahya, McConnell and Travlos (2002) and Huson, 
Malatesta and Parrino (2004) identify forced turnover by examining the report 
released by the press including the Financial Times and the Wall Street Journal. 
They labeled a turnover as a forced turnover when the news articles state that a 
CEO is ''fired'' or ''resigned'' and in both cases the CEO must be less than 55 years 
old. In addition, if an announcement does not provide any reason for the 
departure, such as death, poor health, or the acceptance of other position 
elsewhere or within the firm stated, the departure is also classified as forced 
turnover. Further, removal is also considered as forced turnover since top 
management are removed before the expiration of their three-year term (Kang, 
2002). This study adopts the above guidelines by Friedman & Singh (1989), 
Cannella & Lubatkin (1993), Dahya et al. (2002) and Huson et al. (2004) in 
determining if a turnover is forced or voluntary, upon reading the announcements 
found on the Bursa Malaysia website. A score ''1'' is given for a forced turnover 
and a ''0'', otherwise. 
 
Predecessor disposition (DISP). The variable is coded as ''1'' if the CEO stays in 
the company with a new position, and ''0'' if the CEO leaves the firm (see for 
example, Friedman & Singh, 1989). 
 
Control variables: The control variables in this study are firm size, leverage and 
diversity. It is argued that large firms and those with many business segments 
(diversified) tend to select insiders due to the firms' complex structure and policy, 
while firms with high leverage prefer outsiders as they believe outsiders can 
better turn around firm performance and decrease the leverage level of the firms 
(Dalton & Kesner, 1983; Parrino, 1997; Haniffa & Cooke, 2002; Renneboog, 
2000, Berry, Bizjak, Lemmon, & Naveen, 2006). Firm size (FSIZE) is measured 
as the natural log of total assets, and firm leverage (LEV) as the proportion of 
total debt to total assets. For firm diversification (DIVERS), ''1'' is given for firms 
that have more than one business segment, and ''0'', otherwise (Berry et al., 2006). 
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RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
 
Table 1 shows the descriptive statistics of the characteristics of sampled firms. 
Out of the 145 succession firms, 74 (51%) firms tend to select insiders as 
successors while 71 (49%) firms select outsiders as successors. The mean ROA 
shows that inside selection has a lower mean than outside selection and both 
ROA means have positive values which indicate that on average the sample firms 
are not having financial difficulties. On average, 62% of the board members are 
non-executive directors with a mean of 0.648 for outside selection and 0.614 for 
the inside selection. Interestingly, both ownership structures (family and block 
holders) significantly influence CEO selection choice as both independent t-test 
and Mann Whitney U test display a statistically significant difference for the 
above-mentioned variables. Firms that are controlled by families are more likely 
to select insiders as successors as the mean for family-controlled firms is much 
higher in the inside selection sample as compared to outside selection sample. In 
contrast, the mean of blockholders for outside selection (53.206) is higher than 
that of blockholders in the inside selection (42.132). This result indicates that 
when firms are controlled by blockholders, they are more likely to select 
outsiders as successors. In relation to firm characteristics, the size of firms in the 
outside selection sample are larger than firms in the inside selection sample. The 
mean of total assets in outside selection is RM2976 million compared to RM949 
million in the inside selection. Firms in the outside selection sample also have a 
higher leverage (29.180) than firms in the inside selection sample (25.361).  
 
Table 1 
Descriptive statistics for continuous variables 
 
 
 
Table 2 reports the descriptive statistics for the dichotomous variables. Regarding 
CEO/Chairman duality, 95.9% of the firms separate the role of CEO and 
Chairman. For CEO disposition, only 56 (39%) predecessors remain in the 
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company with other directorships while 89 (61%) of them leave the company. 
From 145 turnover cases, 83 cases are classified as forced turnover and 62 cases 
are determined as voluntary turnover. For firm diversification, 100 of 145 firms 
have more than one business segment as compared to 45 firms that are classified 
as focused firms. 
 
Table 2 
Descriptive statistics for dichotomous variables 
 
Variables All sample  
(n = 145) 
Outsider  
(n = 71) 
Insider 
 (n = 74) 
DUALITY 
''1'' CEO = Chairman 
‘0'' CEO ≠ Chairman 
 
6 (4.1%) 
139 (95.9%) 
 
2 (2.8%) 
69 (97.2%) 
 
4 (5.4%) 
70 (94.6%) 
DIVERS 
''1'' Firm with > 1 business segments 
''0'' Firm without business segment 
 
100 (69.0%) 
45 (31.0%) 
 
45 (63.4%) 
26 (36.6%) 
 
55 (74.3%) 
19 (25.7%) 
DISP 
''1'' Former CEO holding other post 
''0'' CEO out from company 
 
56 (38.7%) 
89 (61.3%) 
 
15 (21.1%) 
56 (78.9%) 
 
41 (55.4%) 
33 (44.6%) 
TURNTYPE 
''1'' Forced turnover 
''0'' Voluntary turnover 
 
83 (37.2%) 
62 (62.8%) 
 
52 (73.2%) 
19 (26.8%) 
 
31 (41.9%) 
43 (58.1%) 
 
 
Table 3 summarises the correlation between all variables involved in this study. 
Among the independent variables, a significant correlation (correlation 
coefficient of –0.59) is found between turnover type and predecessor disposition. 
This indicates that firms which experience CEO forced turnover are less likely to 
retain their predecessor CEO as a member of their board or management team. 
Based on Hair et al. (2006), multicollinearity is not a severe problem here 
because the correlation coefficients are less than 0.7. 
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Table 3 
 Correlation of variables (N = 145) 
 
 
 
Table 4 shows the relationship between firm performance, board attributes, 
ownership structures, predecessor power and outside CEO selection choice, using 
logistic regression analysis. The model reports a significant chi-square statistics 
at a 1% level, suggesting a good fit of the model. The overall classification 
accuracy is 71.0% and the model is able to correctly classify 69.3 % of firms that 
select outsiders as successors and 72.8% of firms that select insiders as 
successors. The Hosmer-Lemeshow goodness-of-fit is more than 5%, which 
indicates that the model estimates fit the data at an acceptable level. The 
Nagelkerke R² is 30.4%, suggesting considerable explanation between dependent 
and independent variables.  
 
Results shown in Table 4 reveal that there is no significant relationship between 
each of performance, board composition, CEO duality, and turnover type, and 
outside CEO selection choice. Thus, the findings do not support Hypotheses 1, 2, 
3 and 6. The findings thus indicate that performance, board composition, CEO 
duality and turnover type do not influence the decision of whether to appoint an 
insider or an outsider as a successor. These findings fail to support the adaptive 
view of succession as far as firm performance is concerned. Rather, it supports 
the contingency view which suggests that board of directors react differently to 
similar performance information. The relationship between performance and 
CEO selection choice is not significant because several socio-political factors 
may moderate the relationship between firm performance and CEO selection 
choice (Cannella & Lubatkin, 1993). However, it is not the objective of this study 
to examine the moderating effect of the factors on the said relationship. 
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Table 4 
 Logistic regression analysis: Outside CEO selection choice 
 
Independent  
variables 
Expected sign B SE Wald 
Ratio 
P-value Exp (B) 
AVROA – –0.170 1.314 0.017 0.449 0.844 
BCOMP + –0.216 1.073 0.041 0.420 0.806 
DUALITY – –0.005 0.967 0.000 0.500 0.995 
FAMILY – –0.028 0.010 7.067 0.004*** 0.972 
BLOCK + 0.023 0.010 5.017 0.013** 1.023 
TURNTYPE – 0.347 0.483 0.516 0.237 0.461 
DISP – –1.061 0.501 4.478 0.017** 0.346 
FSIZE – 0.263 0.325 0.657 0.209 1.301 
LEV + 0.008 0.007 1.042 0.154 1.008 
DIVERS – –0.775 0.454 2.914 0.044** 0.461 
CONSTANT +/– –1.610 2.148 0.562 0.227 0.200 
Ch-square χ 
Degree of freedom 
Hosmer and Lemeshaw 
Cox and Snell R² 
Nagelkerke R² 
Mc Fadden Pseudo- R² 
Classification Accuracy: Overall 
- Outsider Selection 
- Insider Selection 
Sample Size 
- Outside Selection 
- Inside Selection 
37.468*** 
10 
62.6% 
22.8% 
30.4% 
18.5% 
 
71.0% 
69.3% 
72.8% 
145 
71 
74 
 
Findings of this study also support the statement by Gibson (2003) that the power 
of board reduces when the ownership is concentrated in one hand of individuals. 
Due to their limited power, their nomination of CEO new successor may not be 
agreed by concentrated shareholders, which in turn will select their preferred 
CEOs from their families or colleagues. Further, forced turnover also do not lead 
to CEO inside selection. 
 
As far as family ownership is concerned, the result supports H4. This study 
provides evidence that outsiders are not preferred in family-owned firms. An 
internal successor is appointed in family-owned firms in order to maintain family 
status quo, control and job security. Conversely, firms that are controlled by 
blockholders are more likely to choose an outsider as a successor, lending 
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support to H5. As board of directors in blockholders-controlled companies are 
not influenced by shareholders in making its decision, the outsiders will be 
selected as successors.  
 
H7 predicts that firms that retain their predecessor CEOs are more likely to 
appoint insiders as successors, and our result supports the hypothesis. This 
implies that the existence of a predecessor on the board may also influence the 
selection of the successor because it is reasonable to assume that firms that retain 
the former manager in their organizations signal their preferences for some 
continuity (Lauterbach et al., 1999). Thus, an inside succession is preferable than 
an outside succession when the predecessor CEO is still a director. 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
The main objective of this paper is to examine whether firm performance, board 
attributes, ownership structure, turnover type and predecessor disposition 
influence the selection of CEO successors, i.e. whether they are selected from 
inside or outside a company. This study fails to find a significant relationship 
between performance and CEO selection choice. In addition, this study finds that 
board attributes (i.e. the proportion of outside members on board and 
CEO/Chairman duality), are not significant in determining CEO selection choice. 
However, our evidence suggests that firms tend to select an outsider as a 
successor when they are controlled by blockholders. Further, firms that are 
owned by families and retain their incumbent CEOs are more likely to choose an 
insider as a successor.  
 
The major implication of this study is that poor prior performance does not 
necessarily lead to an outside successor, a finding which is different from those 
of most previous studies (see Lauterbach et al., 1999; Cannella & Lubatkin, 
1993; Denis & Denis, 1995). The notion of the adaptive view in that outside 
succession will attract investors' attention that may increase firm future 
performance is not applicable in the Malaysian environment. Rather, the 
contingency view which suggests that directors react differently to similar 
performance information is likely to be applicable.  
 
This study also has important implications for corporate governance and 
ownership structure of organisations which consequently will help companies 
and policy makers in strategizing CEO successions. Boards of the Malaysian 
PLCs should be more effective in choosing outsiders as successors, as this study 
finds that both board composition and CEO duality do not necessarily lead to 
CEO outside selection. This condition may be due to concentrated ownership in 
Malaysian PLCs which reduces the power of the board in making their decisions 
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regarding CEO successions. Firms that are controlled by block holders are more 
likely to select an outsider as a successor. This finding reveals that block holders 
will have more information and communicate extensively with outsiders. As a 
result, they are able to find a suitable outside candidate to fill the vacant post. 
Firms that are controlled by families are more likely to choose an insider as a 
successor for continuity of policies, structure, control and security. These firms 
believe that an insider will provide a smooth transition and stability since he or 
she is well acquainted and have participated in developing existing corporate 
strategies.  
 
Other implication of this study is that the power of predecessor CEO influences 
the choice of the successor. Firms that retain their former CEOs tend to select an 
insider as a successor for the sake of the former CEOs' security as well as other 
board members' security. 
 
Finally, this study provides a basis for future research on CEO succession which 
can be extended in many ways. First, in order to increase the sample size of CEO 
change events, future studies need to include a longer time period so that the 
results can be generalized. Further, as this study focuses on the direct relationship 
between corporate performance and CEO change, future studies may include 
moderating variables that may intervene this relationship such as ownership 
structure and incumbent CEO power.  
 
 
NOTES 
 
1. The main difference between FRS and MASB is in the presentation of the 
income statement which affects the determination of firms' ROA.  
2. Hair, Black, Babin, Anderson and Tatham (2006) explain that both logistic 
regression and discriminant analysis are appropriate statistical techniques when 
the dependent variable is categorical (nominal or nonmetric) and the 
independent variables are metric variables. However, logistic regression is 
preferable because it is less affected when the basic assumptions, particularly 
normality of the variables and equal variances are not fulfilled. Therefore, results 
produced by logistic regression are more robust than discriminant analysis when 
these assumptions are not met. 
3. The omission of MESDAQ companies is due to its newly established market in 
2005 and the exclusion of financial institution is because of the different method 
used in presenting their financial statement which affects the calculation of 
accounting ratio. Companies whose CEOs change more than once are also 
excluded since at least two year performance is needed prior to and after 
turnover events. Companies with joint CEOs are omitted to avoid split turnover. 
Companies experiencing take-overs and mergers and are also excluded as both 
takeovers mergers are considered termination of one company or the new 
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company was established from the combination of two companies. These 
activities may involve top management change including termination of the 
CEO and the selection of new CEO. 
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